Category: Rail

In the same way that it is not the job of a marriage guidance counsellor or psychotherapist to be openly judgmental of their client, for a security service provider to succeed, they need to avoid the blame game. Historical, or even biblical, claims to land are not their issue, nor are the rights and wrongs of political arguments. Whether or not they agree with the strategy of the Israeli government in response to the barbaric attacks of October 7, whatever they think of the integrity of the United Nations and regardless as to who or what they classify as a terrorist or terrorist organization, it is incumbent upon those responsible for aviation security to recognize the likely impact of the conflict. Our aim is to save the lives, and well-being, of those passengers and crew on board our aircraft and over whom we fly. Let’s consider the challenges in achieving this goal.

Like the assassination of JFK, the death of Princess Diana and, of course, the September 11 attacks — subject to one’s age — we all know where we were when the news of the terrorist attacks of October 7 filtered through. When it did, those in the world of security consultancy did not need to listen to any political pundits, academic or otherwise, to know that a line had been crossed and that the impact was going to be far-reaching and devastating. Innocent lives, and many of them, were going to be lost. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might have actually voiced the words, “The Bible says that there is a time for peace and a time for war. This is a time for war,” but most — adore him or loathe him — knew that this was the new reality for the region. Diplomacy, whilst hopefully not extinguished, was clearly on the back burner.

It is impossible to tackle this topic without being deemed to have demonstrated some degree of political bias; few articles have managed to navigate the turbulent waters of opining without doing so. For those of you interested in the conflict, and listening to the viewpoints of both sides, I do recommend “Hurt People Hurt People, October 7 and its Aftermath” (produced by Beetz Brothers and ZDF in association with Zygote Films) — a feature-length documentary, viewable online, which explores the repercussions of the Hamas attacks and the ongoing cycle of violence in the Middle East as a whole. Of course, both sides will claim that “they didn’t mention X,” or “how could they not show Y,” but it does, in 90 minutes, attempt to demonstrate that both sides of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are hurting and both have reason to do so. “Hurt People Hurt People” is not, as so often is alleged, simply a platitude used as an excuse for aggressive behavior; rather, it attempts to delve into the psyche of the average Israeli and the average Palestinian and help understand their respective mindsets and, equally importantly, those of their leaders.

“From the River to the Sea” placard-waving demonstrators, Hamas and Hezbollah apologists or, on the flip side, advocates for Israel’s annexation of the West Bank (and/or reoccupation of the Gaza Strip) and champions of a “greater Israel” are not seeking to empathize with the plight of the other side. They believe in their mantra, listen solely to media outlets reflecting their stance, spread hatred (leading to Islamophobia or antisemitism) through social media and remain convinced that they occupy the moral high ground. There is no concession, nor opportunity for respectful debate.

Those who read my article in this journal a year ago will know that I am a staunch believer in a two-state solution — the state of Israel living harmoniously and securely side-by-side an independent Palestinian state — and whilst that seems a complete pipe dream at the moment, that optimistic vision, or a variation of it, seems to me to be the one solution that offers the potential of a just peace. Around the globe, that aspiration for the so-called “day after” (the conflict) remains the prevalent objective for those not directly scarred by the ravages of war. Fortunately, even in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank, there are those who are actively advocating for it. The Olmert Al-Kidwa peace proposal is just one example of this with former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Nasser Al-Kidwa, a former Palestinian minister of foreign affairs, jointly presenting their plan to Pope Francis at the Vatican on October 17 this year. Amazingly, the mainstream media paid little attention.

In the meantime, the conflict rages on. At the time of writing (October 23), innocent civilians are dying in droves as Israel bombs Hamas, Hezbollah and even Houthi targets ensconced in the midst of population centers (so often beneath hospitals and schools), Israeli towns remain uninhabitable as those same groups launch missile attack after missile attack in the hope of penetrating the Iron Dome, and the 100+ remaining Israeli hostages seized on October 7 have yet to return home. Anger and resentment reign and this could well impact civil aviation around the globe.

I wish to focus on six concerns. The threat to aviation from, or due to:

• industry insiders;

• operations in/over conflict zones;

• the intentional hijacking and/or bombing of aircraft/airports;

• inadvertent carriage of explosives on board aircraft;

• disruption due to protests; and,

• unruly passenger incidents as a result of conflict between passengers and/or crew.

Insider Threats

The insider threat is, I believe, the greatest challenge if one looks at aviation from a global perspective. Often ill-informed opinions, formed on the basis of social media postings, are rife with sometimes well-intentioned advocates for one side or the other liking, sharing or re-posting fake news that further inflames public sentiment. Supposedly unbiased media outlets have clearly taken sides and are shaping public opinion with the imagery they are choosing to show, the words and terminology they are opting to use, the experts they have decided to invite to interview and the degree of balance they are electing to exercise. Against this background, with so many very strong opinions being expressed within families in social groups and at places of worship, there are those who feel that the conflict warrants acts of civil disobedience.

Most western states are keen to ensure that the right to protest remains sacrosanct. The holding of vigils, sit-ins (and die-ins), rallies, marches, the organization of petitions, boycotts, and even effecting walkouts or striking are part and parcel of democracy at work — as long as the rallying call is not in support of terrorist organizations. And here’s the rub — that very caveat. If the opinion of the masses is that a certain group is a legitimate political movement rather than a terrorist organization and/or that a state has gone rogue and is itself committing atrocities, the mood music changes. Peaceful protest can transform into criminal action. When religious ideology enters the equation, the consequences can be catastrophic.

There has been widespread condemnation of Israel on the Arab street and in the Muslim world. With there being almost two billion Muslims and more than 50 states with a Muslim-majority population, their cry is significantly more powerful than that of the 15 million Jews and the one state in which they are the majority. Additionally, the size of the Muslim community in non-Muslim states and the understandable number of non-Muslims who are equally horrified by the deaths, maiming, orphaning and suffering being witnessed on their television screens and on social media, has resulted in a sense of fury with the political leadership of, primarily, western states, supporting Israel. As that sense of injustice brews so does the chance that those employed at airlines, airports, freight forwarding companies, catering and cleaning firms, in law enforcement and in airside operations might decide to act against the industry and its interests. We need to remember that it only takes one rogue employee with a warped ideology to cause a disaster.

The scale of utter hatred being demonstrated on social media platforms is terrifying. The number of employees of airlines, airports, regulatory agencies and, yes, even United Nations bodies in my own LinkedIn network using vile language, expressing clearly antisemitic sentiment and openly calling for the destruction of Israel illustrates that my concern over the insider threat is not far-fetched. And yet, despite this I will resolutely defend the use of behavior detection and argue passionately against racial profiling. Why? Because there are enough people who do not fit a stereotype who could be perpetrators of a terrorist atrocity out there and our focussing on one group would not be conducive to good security practice.

Overflight of Conflict Zones

Aircrew and passenger concern about flying in the region is completely understandable. After all, commercial airliners have been destroyed by surface-to-air missiles in combat zones, or in security-challenging locations, either intentionally or in error. These include the loss of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014 and the destruction of a Ukraine International Airlines flight departing Tehran in January 2020.

“As that sense of injustice brews so does the chance that those employed at airlines, airports, freight forwarding companies, catering and cleaning firms, in law enforcement and in airside operations might decide to act against the industry and its interests.”

The photographs of flights landing in, and departing from, Beirut and Tel Aviv amidst explosions on the ground or Iron Dome intercepts in the skies is unnerving. When one considers that there were in excess of 28,000 rocket, missile or drone attacks on Israel in the year subsequent to October 7 (9,000 rockets were fired by Hezbollah from southern Lebanon), including the two attack waves from Iran, airline risk managers have certainly been earning their keep in respect of operations to and from both Israel and Lebanon, let alone the overflight concerns in the region as a whole.

The Iron Dome has been a phenomenal success story, far exceeding the expectations of many. Yet it is not infallible, and drones have managed to penetrate Israel’s air defenses. Whilst Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis just might do so with intent, neither Israel nor Iran are going to intentionally target civil aviation; that, however, does not mean that an accidental shootdown will not occur.

Exemplifying this, a German media outlet reported that, on October 1, an Air France flight in Iraqi airspace — en route from Paris to Dubai — was dangerously close to being hit by ballistic missiles launched by Iran towards Israel that night.

Hijacking and Bombing

Hijacking might seem passé, but a mindset believing that such tactics will not be used again would be seriously shortsighted. Throughout the 1990s it was argued that terrorist groups had moved on from acts of aerial piracy. And then September 11 happened…

“… an Air France flight in Iraqi airspace – en route from Paris to Dubai – was dangerously close to being hit by ballistic missiles launched by Iran …”

What recent events have demonstrated is that terrorist groups — especially those backed by rogue states — have evolved into highly proficient paramilitary outfits capable of sophisticated operations. The October 7 attacks clearly demonstrated this and the infrastructure unearthed beneath the ground in both Gaza and Lebanon is testament to both the financial investment and commitment to warmongering. I seriously doubt that the United Nations agencies and forces in situ were completely ignorant of what was being created beneath their feet, indicating the degree to which these non-state actors, and their operations, had become “accepted” in an ostrich-like fashion by the international community. That head-in-the-sand attitude was also something Israel’s powers-that-be could be accused of being guilty of in the lead up to October 7 — the indicators were there but there was a failure to act accordingly.

It is this complacency which could come back to bite the aviation industry. We remain committed to the very same technologies and processes that were developed well over a decade ago and in order to identify the same weapons and explosives that were used in the last century. Those who wish to penetrate the aviation system are moving forward at speed. Our opponents are not necessarily have-a-go freedom fighters; they are the types of units that are capable — and have — seized ships by air in the open seas.

Hijacking need not solely be achieved by armed terrorists on board. The potential for cyberattacks and other remote disruption of aircraft operation exists. In February, an El Al Israel Airlines flight was operating from Phuket, Thailand, to Tel Aviv when it received a rogue radio message instructing it to set its route on an alternative heading. It is unclear as to the ultimate goal of the Somaliland-based (some reports claim Somalia-based) transmitters who claimed to be air traffic controllers. One ominous possibility is that they intended to ‘hijack’ the aircraft causing it to fly into the range of a Houthi group in Yemen who could have targeted the aircraft in-flight. Another El Al flight operating to Bangkok the same week received similar notification. In both cases, the crew disregarded the instructions, suspecting external interference, and continued with their intended flight plans.

The day after the first anniversary of the October 7 attacks, Ken McCallum, the director general of the U.K.’s MI5, spoke publicly revealing that, “Since March 2017, MI5 and the police have together disrupted 43 late-stage attack plots. Some of those plotters were trying to get hold of firearms and explosives, in the final days of planning mass murder.” Furthermore, McCallum reported that “13% of all those being investigated by MI5 for involvement in U.K. terrorism are under 18. That’s a threefold increase in the last three years.” In other words, children.

“… an El Al Israel Airlines flight was operating from Phuket, Thailand, to Tel Aviv when it received a rogue radio message instructing it to set its route on an alternative heading.”

“Al-Qaeda has,” according to McCallum, “sought to capitalize on conflict in the Middle East, calling for violent action.” And, when it comes to Iran, he highlighted the fact that, “Like the Russian services, Iranian state actors make extensive use of criminals as proxies — from international drug traffickers to low-level crooks.” It is these communities that could knowingly or unwittingly infiltrate weapons or devices onto aircraft.

Inadvertent Carriage of Explosives

On September 17 a highly sophisticated synchronized remote attack on Hezbollah resulted in pagers exploding in the hands of their militants across Lebanon. If, as very few doubt, it was an Israeli operation, it will go down in folklore — alongside the Entebbe rescue — as being one of their “greatest” intelligence-lead operations of all time. Almost 3,000 people were injured, including Iran’s ambassador to Lebanon, and 12 killed, when they received a message supposedly from Hezbollah leadership.

The next day, walkie-talkies started exploding, killing 30 and injuring more than 700.

Regardless as to whether one believes that the tactic was a completely justified way of attacking known terrorists or one argues that the use of such booby-trapped devices was contrary to international law as it posed a danger to civilian populations, the plot was technologically brilliant. However, it should also sound alarm bells; the pagers had been in circulation for around five months, according to a Reuters source in Lebanon, each one “laced with a highly explosive compound known as PETN” which, because it was “integrated into the battery pack made it extremely difficult to detect.” Another security source told Reuters that “up to three grams (0.11 ounces) of explosives had been hidden in the new pagers, apparently months before the blasts.” 3,000 pagers had exploded, yet 5,000 had been bought by Hezbollah. That means that another 2,000 could still be in circulation. Furthermore, whilst Hezbollah combatants are not known for their regular use of air travel, it is highly likely that many of them did fly — possibly many times — in the five months they had pagers in their possession. None, it would seem, were detected by any airport security screening system.

Of course, three grams of PETN is not enough to bring down an aircraft. Yet if we look at the physical impact of the blasts on those targeted, any such detonation in flight would be more than a slight cause for concern.

Some carriers, including, not surprisingly, Qatar Airways, introduced bans on the carriage of pagers in the aftermath of the attack. The real lessons, however, were that; firstly, remote-controlled improvised explosive devices are very much a reality of the modern world; secondly, that seemingly innocuous devices can operate (for months) normally without impediment and yet still be adapted as an IED; and, thirdly, that our screening systems simply cannot identify all explosives.

Protests

I’ve already mentioned that we wish to preserve the civil right to protest. Yet protests are also a distraction to the security services, especially if they take place at airports.

In September, the Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign organized a protest at Shannon Airport. Their website called for people to, “Join us for a National Mobilization at Shannon Airport on Sunday September 8,, between 2 p.m. and 3.30 p.m., to say ‘Stop Arming Israel – No weapons or military flights to Israel through Shannon!” They even encouraged people to “Book your place on the buses from Dublin and Cork” to protest the Irish government’s refusal “to inspect U.S. warplanes that stop at Shannon Airport or otherwise use Irish airspace.”

On April 15, pro-Palestinian activists prevented traffic from accessing Terminal 1 at Chicago’s O’Hare airport. Forty of them were allegedly arrested for the disruption they caused.

These are just two of a myriad of airport-based incidents around the globe, each one providing a challenge to the local law enforcement community. Arguably more problematic are the individual protests industry employees are conducting by wearing emblems or flags associated with the conflict. Aircrew often wear flags to depict the languages they speak, but their wearing of the Palestinian flag has been a cause for debate on social media — some applauding them for standing up for what they believe in, others condemning them for displaying political bias whilst in a work environment.

Qantas passengers on a flight from Melbourne to Hobart on December 20 last year were shocked to find that crewmembers had affixed the Palestinian flag to their lapels. Photographs appeared on social media and the airline was forced to remind its crew of its uniform policy. In a January 4 statement, Qantas stated, “We understand there are strong and opposing views on the current conflict, but there is no room for these to be expressed by our employees in the workplace. Our priority is creating a safe and respectful environment for our customers and all our people. Unauthorized badges can’t be worn by employees and we’ve reminded all employees of the policy, along with the seriousness of this particular matter.”

On July 5 this year, a Delta flight attendant was photographed wearing a Palestinian pin on a flight from Boston to West Palm Beach, and in May a Delta gate agent was wearing one at Ronald Regan airport.

The issue is not the Palestinian flag alone — Israeli, Ukrainian, and any other flag not indicative of the language spoken by the crewmember in question is inappropriate in a professional work environment.

Unruly Passengers

With Islamophobia and antisemitism on the rise and so much anger related to the conflict being openly expressed, it’s hardly surprising that, regardless of what pins crewmembers might wear, there will be plenty of opportunities for animosity between different passenger types. It’s prevalent on public transport systems on the ground too.

On October 21, a passenger was photographed on the Paris Metro at Saint-François-Xavier station wearing a shirt emblazoned with the words ‘Anti Juif’ (Anti Jew). Imagine this had been worn on an aircraft and the potential fallout.

In July it was reported that a passenger was told that he would be removed from a Delta flight from São Paulo to Chicago if he did not take off his pro-ceasefire T-shirt which had “Not in Our Name” on the front side and “Jews Say Ceasefire Now” on the back. Whilst advocating for peace, the political nature of the slogan clearly caused the crew anxiety.

In December, an argument took place in Melbourne, Australia, between Jewish and Muslim passengers boarding a Jetstar flight to Sydney. The latter is alleged to have shouted, “Stop killing our babies,” and the former responded, “From Hamas.”

These are the now increasingly frequent challenges aircrew are dealing with many miles from the conflict itself. They may seem petty in comparison to the desperation of those living in the Middle East itself, yet airlines are having to adapt their training programs to enable crew to best manage political divide … be it Israel/Palestine, Trump/Harris, Russia/Ukraine or any other combination.

A year on from October 7 and the region is in a very precarious position. Indeed, so is the world as a whole. The last year has demonstrated innovation in the art of war on all sides, so we need to evolve too and enhance our ability to deliver proactive security. And, if that were not a big enough challenge in itself, we also need to do so whilst exercising political neutrality.

Philip Baum is Visiting Professor of Aviation Security, Coventry University; Managing Director, Green Light Ltd; Chair, DISPAX World 2024 (November 20-21, 2024, Bangkok);, and, Chair, Behavioral Analysis 2025 (June 24-26, 2025, Minneapolis, USA). He is also the former editor of Aviation Security International. He can be contacted at pbaum@avsec.com.

Now more than ever, effective perimeter fencing is a must for the transportation industry. Threats from thieves, trespassers and unwitting members of the public wandering into danger areas is a serious issue for land, air and sea transport firms/facilities.

Providing effective fencing is what companies such as Jacksons Fencing (www.jacksons-security.co.uk) and RBtec Perimeter Security Systems (www.rbtec.com) are all about. Based in Stowting Common, U.K., Jacksons Fencing has been securing properties since 1947. RBtec has been keeping perimeters safe since 1986, and is headquartered in North Bergen, New Jersey.

“Jacksons Fencing is one of the U.K.’s leading security fencing manufacturers and installers,” said Nick Bishenden, the company’s senior manager. “The transportation facilities sector is a key sector that we work in and have helped revolutionize how to increase security using fencing.”

“RBtec provides a perimeter security system for any transportation system; airport, trains, bus depots and such,” said Dori Ribak, the company’s vice president of marketing. “We offer a variety of solutions: We are not a one-size-fits-all company.”

In the following virtual roundtable, TSI asked Bishenden and Ribak about what’s new and different in perimeter fencing. Here is what they told us.

TSI: What advances have been made in perimeter fencing for transportation facilities?

Nick Bishenden: Over the past decade, “smart fencing” technology has evolved significantly. Initially, these systems relied on basic vibration detection sensors attached to fences, which were prone to false alarms. Today, however, we have moved to more sophisticated solutions, such as fully monitored high and low voltage electrified perimeter intrusion detection systems (PIDS), which are now commonly used. These advances have greatly enhanced site security by providing more reliable intrusion detection.

Acoustic fencing is often preferred for its additional benefits in the sector. Acoustic fencing is compatible with PIDS systems and offers several advantages over traditional metal security fences. It not only reduces noise and provides privacy but also minimizes light pollution.

Additionally, acoustic fences are designed without foot or handholds, making them more difficult to climb. This results in longer attack times compared to metal-style fences. Moreover, they are more aesthetically pleasing, which can be a significant factor for sites concerned with their appearance.

This type of fencing is ideal for transport infrastructure that often generates significant environmental noise and has strict requirements for security and privacy.

Dori Ribak: RBtec uses different technologies for different perimeter fencing applications.

For instance, we have small fence sensor kits called IRONCLAD, that are designed for smaller sites, meaning the perimeter is short. They would apply to train depots or small transportation support sites, such as a radar station or something like that, that are not necessarily inside the airport perimeter.

As for large sites? To protect their perimeters, we have a fiber optic system called RaySense AI DAS. RaySense is a distributed acoustic sensing sensor that can monitor up to 60 miles’ worth of perimeter. This means that we can theoretically cover a whole airport with one unit.

RaySense comes in a couple of versions. We have a small version that is up to six miles for smaller parameters and from six miles to 60 miles for the larger.

Then there’s LIDAR. With LIDAR, we can know the depth of the scenery and how far from the sensor the intruder is and which direction they’re walking in. For instance, using a real-time LIDAR image of a train platform, we can see the train and the platform where people are standing. This allows you to detect if someone is jumping or falling, by crossing a line and triggering an alarm.

As far as AI and its use in perimeter security, we employ AI to detect certain frequencies and vibrations. We train the system to know that if this vibration comes in a certain frequency, it’s an intrusion — versus low frequency vibrations due to wind or rain, which are false alarms.

TSI: Are you using AI solely for detection purposes?

Dori Ribak: No. AI has played a huge role in allowing us to set up perimeter fences quickly, instead of having to manually adjust them on a section-by-section basis. Take an airport installation: Using AI, instead of needing a three- to six-week calibration process, we can do it in less than a week.

AI-enabled perimeter fencing is playing a huge role in making those systems more accessible, more reliable and more cost effective, to be honest. If you don’t have to sit down and engineer for a month to calibrate the system, then the overall solution is cheaper as well.

TSI: Overall, how do transportation sites use these kinds of advanced perimeter fencing solutions to protect their premises?

Nick Bishenden: Transportation facilities rarely use these systems in isolation. Instead, they are typically integrated into a comprehensive security strategy that includes perimeter fencing, gate systems, automated gates, and turnstiles. This multi-layered approach significantly strengthens overall security.

TSI: How well have these advances been accepted by the global transportation industry as a whole?

Nick Bishenden: Recent advances have significantly improved site security by providing more reliable perimeter intrusion detection systems (PIDS). Overall, PIDS have greatly benefited the transport sector. Not only do they act as a deterrent to opportunistic attacks, but they also offer a robust barrier for high-security sites, allowing instant CCTV recording and manned security to swiftly respond to breaches within minutes.

Transport hubs and storage facilities have leveraged PIDS to reduce costs and decrease the need for on-site security personnel. In the event of a breach, CCTV can focus on the attack and a remote team can be notified and dispatched to the location, often arriving faster than traditional security guards, who might only be alerted once an intruder has already entered a building or vehicle.

Dori Ribak: Oh, the industry response so far has been amazing. With RaySense, once we introduced the new AI unit, we have had record sales with that system since it came out. AI makes it easy to install, makes it cheaper, and more accessible as a general idea.

TSI: All told, what positive results are being delivered by these advanced fencing products? And what is coming next?

Nick Bishenden: They have significantly enhanced the security of the sector by not only reducing attacks and vandalism but also minimizing damage and theft when sites are targeted.

Security remains a top priority, which means advances in technology and fencing to improve security are inevitable. The future of fencing goes beyond just providing security; we are already seeing this with innovations like our acoustic barriers. Following the successful launch of our solar fence panel range, we envision fences that offer multiple solutions. Imagine a fence that not only enhances the aesthetics of a transport site but also reduces noise and light pollution, provides robust security, and generates solar energy. This is the future of perimeter fencing — multifunctional, sustainable, and innovative.

This being said, in the U.K., “smart fencing” and technology is important but specifying the correct fence for an application is still a problem. Standards such as LPS 1175 have helped but more work is needed to educate architects and specifiers to create a 3D approach where PIDS, the physical fencing, gates, automation, and the likes of Vehicle Access Control Points (VACPs) are specified and all work together to create a layered security approach.

The air traffic control recording was chilling: “We’ve got the guy that tried to shut the engines down out of the cockpit…. I think he’s subdued,” radioed the pilot of Horizon Air flight 2059. The Embraer EMB-175 (see graphic 1) diverted to Portland, Oregon, instead of its intended destination of San Francisco. Once on the ground, law enforcement officials confirmed just how close a 44-year-old off-duty Alaska Airlines pilot — Joseph Emerson — came to bringing down a commercial aircraft with 83 souls on board this past October.

Emerson (see graphic 2) was commuting back home and was authorized to ride in the cockpit jump seat like any airline pilot — a common practice in the industry. He made casual conversation with the crew during the flight before suddenly throwing his headset across the cockpit, announcing “I am not OK,” and grabbing the two red T-shaped “fire handles” on the cockpit ceiling (see graphic 3) meant to shut down the engines in an emergency. To fully activate the system, the handle must be first pulled down, which cuts off fuel, electrical power, and hydraulics to the engine. Twisting the handle then releases halon gas inside the engine to smother a fire. One of the pilots quickly grabbed Emerson and reset the handles. The airline reported that residual fuel remained in the lines, and the quick reaction of the crew restored the fuel flow. The crew then subdued Emerson and got him out of the flight deck.

Just four days before this disturbing event, another pilot — Jonathan J. Dunn — was indicted and charged with interfering with a flight crew over an incident that occurred during a Delta Air Lines flight in August 2022. Dunn, who was the first officer, threatened to shoot the captain after a disagreement over diverting the flight to take care of a passenger with a medical issue. Dunn was authorized by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to carry a gun under a program created after the September 2001 terror attacks and designed to safeguard the cockpit from intruders. The Federal indictment stated that Dunn “did use a dangerous weapon in assaulting and intimidating the crewmember.” Dunn has since been fired, and his gun was taken away.

These incidents have renewed the debate about psychological screening of pilots, which initially began in 2015 when First Officer Andreas Lubitz (see graphic 4) locked the captain out of the cockpit of a Germanwings Airbus A320 before intentionally ramming it into the French Alps, killing all 150 people on board (see graphic 5). According to the final report, the copilot started to suffer from severe depression in 2008. In July 2009, and each year thereafter, his medical certificate continued to be renewed. About a month before the crash, a private physician recommended the copilot receive psychiatric hospital treatment due to a possible psychosis, but no aviation authority was informed.

The State of Play of Pilot Mental Health Assessments

The “insider threat” has always been a significant concern with regard to aviation security. The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) regulations require airline pilots to undergo a medical exam by an Aviation Medical Examiner (AME) every six months. The AMEs are trained to determine the pilot’s mental health and fitness to fly. While this process provides a means to vet airline pilots, it relies largely on trusting pilots to volunteer information about their mental health.

Pilots are required to disclose during their medical exam any medications they take and whether they have depression, anxiety, drug, or alcohol dependence. They are also required to report any doctor visits during the previous three years and all medical history on their FAA medical application form. This form includes questions about mental health. Based on the answers on the form and the examination, an AME may ask further questions about mental health conditions or symptoms. The AME can request additional psychological testing, or defer the application to the FAA Office of Aerospace Medicine if he or she is concerned that further evaluation is necessary (see graphic 6).

In addition, commercial airlines often have their own mental health screenings and requirements, and they conduct background checks on prospective pilots. Many airlines – such as Alaska Airlines — have also established pilot peer programs to encourage pilots to talk to other pilots about their problems. Apparently, these efforts are not foolproof in preventing these types of incidents.

Previous Events and a Common Thread

Over the past decade, there have been at least seven airline events in which a flight crewmember was suspected of having intentionally crashed the aircraft, or attempted to do so (see graphic 7). Three of these events occurred in the U.S. or involved a U.S. air carrier. When looking further back three decades, these types of events were less frequent, but equally dramatic. Perhaps the most dramatic occurred in April 1994, when FedEx Flight 705 was hijacked by an off-duty jump seat rider. Facing possible dismissal for lying about his reported flight hours, FedEx pilot Auburn Calloway (see graphic 8) boarded a scheduled cargo flight as a deadheading pilot with a guitar case carrying hammers and a speargun. After a bloody battle with the flight crew, the airplane was able to land safely. Five years later, First Officer Gameel Al-Batouti (see graphic 9) intentionally crashed Egypt Air flight 990, a Boeing 767, into the Atlantic Ocean shortly after takeoff from New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport. All 217 people on board were killed.

Security expert Tom Anthony, a former FAA division manager for Civil Aviation Security who is now the director of the University of Southern California’s Aviation Safety and Security Program (see graphic 10), worked on the EgyptAir 990 case, and studied the FedEx flight 705 event. It was no surprise to him when he heard the testimony of family and friends about Joseph Emerson, the pilot involved in the recent Horizon Air flight 2059. The media reported that Emerson’s neighbors were “shocked” that he was involved in the incident, and that he is “a loving husband and father” to his two young sons. Emerson’s wife Sarah Stretch told reporters that her husband, “…never would’ve knowingly done any of that …That is not the man that I married.” She said she knew her husband was struggling with depression but was shocked over his arrest.

“The number one precondition is severe depression,” Anthony explained. He said that each one of us has three personas: (1) the “social self” that we share with the public, friends, and colleagues; (2) the “personal self” that we share only with our spouse or closest family and friends, and (3) our private “secret self,” which we share with no one. It’s that “secret self” that can be difficult to identify.

Anthony says that a probable factor in the rise of these events is the lack of social support. “The internet has had a huge impact … it has led to a lot more time in isolation.” In addition, he says “the internet allows people to indulge in their private side … kind of a “mal-private self.”

He explained that Callaway from the FedEx, Lubitz with Germanwings, and Al-Batouti all had previous incidents “that were ignored or not captured.” All displayed symptoms of depression such as insomnia, unwillingness to engage in normal conversations, and other common indicators.

“We have to acknowledge that mental conditions can be hazards … just another hazard that needs to be identified and mitigated,” he said. “We need to find better ways to “identify behaviors that point to hazards.”

Anthony also believes that the current shortage of airline pilots is another factor that is exacerbating the problem. Pilots that are being hired do not have as long resume with former companies in which background checks can be performed. Also, there has been a marked decrease in the number of pilots that have military backgrounds. There is “less opportunity to know them,” explained Anthony.

Mitigating the Risk of Suicide by Aircraft

The Germanwings tragedy highlighted the importance of monitoring airline pilot psychological health. As a result, the FAA chartered a Pilot Fitness Aviation Rulemaking Committee in 2015 to assess methods used to evaluate and monitor pilot mental health and to identify possible barriers to reporting concerns. The final report concluded that “the best strategy for minimizing the risks related to pilot mental fitness is to create an environment that encourages and is supportive of pilot voluntary self-disclosure.”

The report also noted, “Early identification of mental fitness issues leads to better results.” The committee offered recommendations including the use of pilot assistance programs and stated that when a culture of mutual trust is created, pilots are less likely to conceal conditions and more likely to seek help for mental health issues. This is similar to the work that the airline industry successfully performed in the 1990s to remove the stigma around alcoholism.

To its credit, the FAA responded to the committee’s recommendation on a number of fronts. During the last several years, the FAA has invested in more resources to eliminate the stigma around mental health in the aviation community so that pilots seek treatment. This includes: increased mental health training for medical examiners; support of industry-wide research and clinical studies on pilot mental health; hiring additional mental health professionals to expand in-house expertise and to decrease wait times for return-to-fly decisions; completed clinical research and amended policy to decrease the frequency of cognitive testing in pilots using antidepressant medications, and; increased outreach to pilot groups to educate them on the resources available

The FAA asserts that it is a misconception that if you report a mental health issue, you will never fly again. In fact, the FAA states that only about 0.1% of applicants for a medical certificate who disclose health issues are ultimately denied a medical, and then only after an exhaustive attempt to “get to yes.”

A New Push for Answers

In response to this issue, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) hosted a “Summit on Pilot Mental Health” this past November. The agency’s chair, Jennifer Homendy, has been a vocal critic about the issue. “There’s a culture right now, which is not surprising to me, that you either lie or you seek help,” said Homendy during the forum. “We can’t have that. That’s not safety.”

Homendy called for some form of an amnesty period from the FAA where pilots who have experienced issues can discuss their situation openly without fear of repercussions. “We are all human,” Homendy said. “Who hasn’t among us faced some sort of crisis in our lives? We expect pilots will be some superheroes and continue on as if nothing’s happened in our lives … Everyone is in need of help at some point.”

The day before the NTSB Summit, the FAA announced that it was appointing another Rulemaking Committee to examine pilot mental health “to provide recommendations on breaking down the barriers that prevent pilots from reporting mental health issues to the agency.” The committee will include medical experts and aviation and labor representatives, and will build on previous work the FAA has done to prioritize pilot mental health. In addition, the FAA will work with the committee to address open recommendations from a July 2023 audit report from the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General (OIG) regarding pilot mental health challenges.

The DOT OIG report confirmed that the FAA’s ability to mitigate safety risks is limited by pilots’ reluctance to disclose mental health conditions. Primary factors that discourage pilots from reporting are the stigma associated with mental health, potential impact on their careers, and fear of financial hardship.

The DOT OIG report also asserted that it is imperative that the FAA continue to address barriers that may discourage pilots from disclosing and seeking treatment for mental health issues. Also, a continued focus on this issue from the FAA and industry stakeholders could improve mental health outcomes for airline pilots and enhance the FAA’s ability to mitigate safety risks.